

**AFRICA'S STATES OF FRAGILITIES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

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ABSTRACT:

The modern state has exhibited a general tendentious slide towards fragility and imminent decline in the recent times. State fragilities, state failures and state collapse have consequently become recurring issues in global discourse. This paper posits that how states form, why they fail and how they can re-build impacts largely on their potentialities to slide into fragilities, failures or eventual collapse. Spike in numbers of fragile and failing states undoubtedly presents us with perhaps one of the most fundamental of all the sundry challenges posed to global peace, security and order in the 21st Century. The paper highlights the strategic imports of these ominous trends on the African continent and how they adversely impact the evolving global village order. It also attempts to evaluate possible pragmatic responses needed to reposition the Africa state on a solid stead.

KEYWORDS: State Formation, Fragile state, States Failure, State Collapse, State Building.

Introduction:

Origin of the modern state has roots in the 1684 Treaty of Westphalia. The Westphalia state systemic arrangement has been quite robust but due to changing global trends, it has faced sundry challenges and potential existential threats recently and with a consequential weakening of its authority and legitimacy. Its potentialities are also now currently exposed to sundry issues centred on questions as to whether it is still a valid construct that can continue to carry the political imagery of the society or whether it has become a moribund construct and one that should be discarded following its growing

tendentious slide towards fragilities as experienced in the recent time. These trends are especially evident in most locations across the so-called Third World regions where we have experienced a steady slide from inefficiencies, to outright failures and ultimately states verging on total collapse.

This paper argues that, this unfortunate slide from fragilities, failing state capacities to outright failures and imminent collapse or demise, is attributable to inherent fault-lines in human agency social actions incidental on the ways and manners these states were constituted at the onset. Such fault-lines stem from pronounced defaults or outright commission on the part of the European colonial masters and the political elites in each state instance. The implication here is that, after their creation, there has always been a natural eventuality for them to decay at a later stage in their evolutionary process. However, it is the rate and scope of degradation that actually differentiates sundry states of fragilities across the continent. And this ideally, is attributable to a medley of factors. First, we have the manners of their structural formations and compositions at inception. Second, we have the manner of their capacities to extract, exploit and utilize available natural resources endowments for the common good of their communities. Third, we also have the manner of equitable distribution and efficient utilization of available natural resources endowments for the individual wellbeing of citizens of the state. And fourth, we have the manners in which the elites in each state instance have been able to position themselves and favourably compete in their unavoidable inter-exchanges with a deluge of other competing externalities on the foreign plane.

As it were, this conditionality highlights the intervening agencies of four cardinal causal factors we can situate at the roots of all fragile, failed and collapsed state structures. Their presence or otherwise or indeed the qualities of their impacts would present us a vivid picture of how we can assess a state's capacity to perform or its incapacity in performing its statutory functions. First, we have need for the presence of consensual agreements at the foundation of the state formations. Second, there is need for a consensual formula for efficient resource extractions—one that is not predatory or based on individual volitions, but one that promotes commitment of the citizenry to the common good. Three, there is also need for the presence of the rule of law, ample mechanisms and institutions for checks, balance in addition to presence of credible disincentives for deviant behaviours with potential adverse impacts on the common good in public space. And fourth, there is need for a crop of knowledgeable elites with the requisite intellectual suave and finesse needed to favourably manoeuvre the murky waters of international politics so as to re-position their states strategically on the foreign scene in order to achieve their national interest constructs. It is pertinent to note here that, this last condition owes deep roots in the claimant by key realist scholars that, all states are self-interested cheats (Wendt 1992; Waltz, 1998) and whose existential aspiration are usually at great variance with each other.

By implication, every fragile state, failed state and indeed, collapsed state instance tends to profit some states whose national interests crisscross with states in such dilemmas within the system. And in most cases, such externalities often tend to trump other endogenous causal factors usually attributed to the rubric of anomic state instances in the system. This is most prevalent in locations where there are strategic natural resources deposits waiting to be illicitly exploited by shadow state structures acting usually in concert with or as proxies to other maleficent states. This trend is also prominent where there is the presence of weak or absence of a sovereign power exercising at best only a salutary control over such a sovereign geo-political space. It is against this backdrop that this paper will critically analyze the causation existing between the manners of state formation, state failures and state building as a compound variable in the on-going attempts aimed at understanding the crisis of state failures and state building across Africa.

This paper is structured into six sections: Section 1 highlights essences and theoretical origins of the modern state as a way to situate how implementation of the structural functions in each stage could impact strategically on potentiality for future state integrity or potential anomie; Section 2 interrogates the generic *raison de tat* of the state as a basis to drive home the argument that strong states are always built on the synergies existing between their *raison de tat* and collective aspirations of their citizens especially, whenever there exists a general consensus that the state is the only logical vehicle to achieve these aspirations; Section 3 elucidates on the cardinal functions of the state as a means to provide a background to the discourse centred on how we can vividly determine whence a state begins to fail in its statutory functions; Section 4 critically interrogates veracities of the attributes often allocated to the state of fragility, failing state and collapsed state continuum by scholars as a way to determine the objectivity and applicability of these parameters to the African context; Section 5 attempts to harmonize variances in scholarly postulations on possible causal factors attributable to this anomic continuum as associated with the state, especially, as applicable to the African context. Section 6 highlights a broad range of policy implications centred on how states can actually (re)build through a proposed constant push-pull proactive manner that distracts from the reactivity of present Eurocentric models of state building now dominant on the foreign scene today.

1. *Essences and Theoretical Origins of the State*

a) *Essences of the state:*

The state is perhaps one of the most ingenious contraptions ever invented by man for his own well-being and in concert with others. Such an imperative evinces acceptance of an innate human weakness—an inability to go it all alone, otherwise, in the ordered interactions with other men. This view of man's ingenious creation is also encompassing so much so that it has elicited a wide range of definitions from scholars right through the ages. Weber (1958) states that this contraption can be taken to mean a veritable source of political order based upon its ability to monopolize the means of violence. Grindle (1991) posits that, the state is an instrument for enhancing the social welfare of its citizens. Findlay (1991) describes it as an instrument of involuntary re-distribution of

the commonwealth. Evans (1995) posits that it can be taken to mean a vehicle needed to drive overall development of the commonwealth. Anderson(1991) says it is an 'imagined community' and one that is required to spread the feeling of nationalism across a geo-political space. The 1648 Westphalia Treaty signed by World powers actually provides the logical basis for us to concretize and conceptualize the true essences of the modern state. In addition, the revolutions in 1776 (America) and 1789 (France) have also helped us to further etch its structural form, and its mode of operation on the concrete stones of history.

In any case, we all know that the state is also conflated with the other notion of a 'nation'—the latter is generally perceived as the soul of the state. It represents the 'human component' of the state and often times it is taken to mean what the Oxford dictionary defines as a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory. It therefore means that the state and the nation are two critical entities embedded with symbiotic synergies and possessing complementary co-operate identities. Kymlicka(1995) defines a nation as a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or home land, sharing a distinct language and culture. Anderson (1983) perceives it also as an imagined community cast as both inherently limited and sovereign in a geo-spatial sense. This is possibly why there have been tendencies by European scholars over time to advance the notion of a 'nation-state' characterization as an attempt to exalt an universalist and preferred reference point in defining this ingenious human political construct called the nation-state.

This paper however observes that, the nation-state connotation evokes grim imageries of a political dissonance and an asymmetric political dominance of one group over others with potentials for outbreaks of multiply entropic strives and an eventual slide towards 'states of fragilities' (Ovie-D-Leone, 2019a) as we currently experience globally. In this instance, such a conception is obviously counter intuitive and out rightly misleading. To impose this type of contentious nomenclature on any new and emergent state, especially, the heterogeneous models evolving across the developing world where we have experienced some of the most wide spread slides into states of fragilities in the recent time, amounts to a gross conflation of the actual realities on ground across these region. Consequent upon this assertion, we will like to propose instead a 'state-nation(s)' conception for the modern state as a better frame needed to accommodate extremities of the pervasive heterogeneities existing in the non-European locations across the developing World, especially in Africa. We argue that the connotation of a 'nation-state' tends to conflate the real characters of the trajectories often attributable to states of fragilities that exemplify the inability of a dominant group to continue asserting its authority over such geo-political space. In converse, a state-nation(s) connotation tends to situate a trajectory where all intergroup interests converge and it does offer us a better frame to clearly identify potentials for conflict outbreaks or possible roots causes for the usual relapse into states of fragilities.

Rationale for the 'state-nation' connotation here also has strategic implications for how we ought to interpret and respond to states of fragilities in Africa. We propose that, this could be done through new and novel models of state building chores in the contemporary time that incorporate much of local and grassroots components instead of the usually standard impositions of multiple externalities. As it were, such an assertion tendentiously also opens up potentials for a supposedly wide ambiance for political inclusion of all composite groups within the state. In comparison, the 'nation-state' connotation also grossly subjects the collective will of the composite group to the selfish interests of the dominant group(s) that bestraddle the official political power apparatus in such state instance. Viewed critically therefore, the nation-state connotation even also gives a false air of pre-eminence of the nation over the state in that causation, whereas the state, after it is formed obviously usurps the essence and authority of the nation. Consequently, a better connotation ought to be the notion of a 'state-nation(s)' as earlier suggested (Ovie-D'Leone, 2019a). This conception rightly privileges the state over the other competing 'otherness' within its sphere and over whom it claims sovereign supremacy and primacy. This also presents us a better stand plank to evolve a so-called 'patriotic identity' instead of the so-called salutary claimant of a 'nationalistic' ethos usually required as a pre-condition to cement inter-group relations within the state. The end result of applying a state-nation connotation is that, all groups will then see themselves as equal stakeholders in any 'state-nation' instance.

Whence a state forms, how it is composed, how it is administered and the neighbourhood where it is located ideally have direct bearings on its capacity for growth and development on one hand, as well as, its potentials to slide into 'states of fragilities' and possible collapse on the other hand (Ovie-D-Leone, 2019a). Any attempt to redress the root causes or trajectories for any slide into 'states of fragilities' ought to then take off logically from the standpoint of a critical assessment of the origins of the state itself. Many theories abound in this area of discourse centred on origins of state. But five of these models are quite dominant and will be instructive here in the discourse. They include Force theory, Social Contract theory, Organic Growth theory, Divine Rights of Kings theory. In the light of its main objectives, this paper is inclined to add a sixth critical theoretical origin of the state. We call this the Arbitrary Imposition theory which can be subsumed under the Origin Force theory.

b) Theoretical origins of the state:

i) The Force theory evinces a predatory view of the state and positions it as an agency that exalts the use of force for extraction purpose and as a critical basis its evolution. Such an account is most valid especially in the European locations where scholars like Tilly (1997) have argued that 'war' made the European states and the European state made war to become as domineering as they are today on the global stage. If we place this view against backdrop of trends in the non-European state like we have in Africa, it is evident that these states were never products of such wars and therein lay the

fundamental weaknesses in this theory. This theory does not account succinctly for the vagaries of pervasive poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, lack of mutual trust and consensus that could invariably present war making as vital components of nation-state building functions. If implemented in Africa, we obviously would see potentials for outright anarchy and perpetual disorder. We cannot therefore use this frame of analysis to determine empirically any notion of 'states of fragility' (Ovie-D-Leone, 2019) of the modern African state. This therefore calls for a review of other theoretical frames.

ii) The Social Contract theory owes deep roots in Western liberal idealism that exalts a push-pull synergy between the elites and the masses. From prominent social contract scholars like Locke to Hobbes and even to Rousseau, the assumption has always been that there was an imaginary consensual agreement between the ruler and the ruled resulting in a social contract acting as the bedrock for evolving these states. Again, this account is implausible in the non-European locations. It is an alien ideal that contrasts sharply with the patrimonial and communitarian ethos prevalent in highly traditional and tribal societies in non-European locations. Applying such a frame of analysis in this instance therefore has a tendency to backstage traditional authority systems wherefrom citizens have drawn inspirations and moral interpretations for their social actions over time. It also has a tendency to create critical crises of legitimacy for the modern state and its government and would obviously conflate prospects for assessing 'states of fragilities anywhere in Africa.

iii) The theory of organic origins of the state exalts the paternalistic or authoritarian attributes of a superior male figure within the atomic family that is presented as the nucleus of the evolving state. Most of the European states actually evolved initially as Kingdoms after which through the utilities of war conquest, Kingdoms expanded into Empires and later Empires blossomed into super states. However, its validity as a theory is obviously weakened if also applied to the non-European locations where such accounting is at best ahistorical. In highly heterogeneous societies, such a claimant that premises utilities of a group's dominance over others has potentials for even greater social fissures and hence it is counterintuitive as a state building precondition in places like Africa.

iv) Ideally speaking, the divine origin theory exalts absolutism of a privilege individual who appropriates to himself the role of a sovereign entity superior to the otherness of the composite individuals and groups within a community. Such a personage claims an ethereal divine ordinance to justify his dominance and subjugation of others to his personal whims and caprices. Again, there is weakness in this assertion when applied to non-European locations where such an accounting is also ahistorical given the presence of multi-cultures in non-European states that readily conflate any such claimant. Consequently, in the absence of any holistic religious belief system commonly adhered to by all composite groups, such a claimant will also be counterintuitive in its application, since it will invariably lead to autocracy in the standard African community

with potentials to breed multiple layers of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts often situated at the roots of states' relapse into states of fragilities (Ovie-D-Leone, 2019).

v) The Arbitrary imposition '*model*' we argue, tends to better highlight real-time trends in locations like Africa. Africa was a product of the awry manners of states cartography by European powers at their Berlin conference of 1884-1885. We argue that, this view of Africa presented by European powers actually begs for urgent state dissolution or radical state restructuring as it seemingly evinces by the current range of discourses on 'states of fragility' causations in the contemporary time.

However, it is against backdrop of these theoretical frames on origins of the state, that we have attempted to conceptualize five generic universal paradigms of state formations in attempt to situate how their origins could catalyze potentials for the general relapse into 'states of fragilities' (Ovie-D'Leone, 2019a). The first model is premised on *war making dynamics*; the second model advances the notion of the *mutual negotiations* between the sovereign and the masses; the third model highlights the *natural evolutionary* processes of human societies that privileges a premier position for the male gender figure in affairs of the state; the fourth model is predicated on the *divine mandate* of a supreme deity that exalts the capricious aspirations of a so-called chosen individual over everybody in the society; and the fifth is the *deviant model* that highlights the chicaneries and unbridled intrigues of European imperial powers intent on appropriating every useful human and material resources from their formal colonies for the benefits of their home economics and at the detriment of indigenous populations.

It is however pertinent to note also that the use of 'force' seemingly is dominant in all instances of state creation. Bates (1983) and the likes of More (1966) looked far back into human annals in attempts to highlight the utility of force in evolving human societies. However, from our current theoretical postulations, the first instance of the use of force - in force theory, is evidently so whilst the second instance highlighting the so-called social contract is heavily embedded with a possible long history of prevalence of force during the 'state of nature' era. The third instance also evinces the ubiquitous nature and presence of the coercive use of force as a pivot in stamping the authority of the patriarch on family members. The fourth instance also has force embedded in the divine absolutism of the Monarch. The fifth instance was also an application of forceful imposition of European externalities on the colonies in so far as the indigenous population had no say as to what state(s) they wish to belong. From this standpoint therefore, we argue further here that, the modern state structure is ideally a product of raw application of force in varying proportions and intensities. Agreements only came into the picture after one side has been vanquished in a war. Other forms of agreements incidental on other forms of state creations where deliberate alignment of forces within a region intended to deter applications of force from other externalities like the Treaty of Alba Ulia in 1907 that gave birth to Romania. Here, three territories: Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania voluntarily opted to form the state of Romania.

Against the backdrop above, the question that steers us in the face is, how can we legitimate force as a basis for state formation in Africa in the light of the continent's 'ethnic and tribal heterogeneities'? We argue here that in their present formats, the use of force in Africa as a basis for state creation cannot be sustained as trends in the European locations. Rather, we argue for mutual negotiations like trends in Albania which evince as a way to ensure a healthy rebirth of each instance of 'states of fragility' in Africa. Virtually all states instance on the continent are composed of competing multiple *raison de tats* linked to the composite group aspirations. We therefore submit that, the notion of an 'consensual agreements' therefore is a better vehicle needed to drive state re-creation mechanism in Africa. This actually inheres in the fact that there is no single credible *raison de tat* of state as proven yet to be sustainable anywhere in locations in Africa. Composite groups should then agree voluntarily to dissolve failing state instances especially, where incompatibilities are obvious irresolvable. This is given the fact that, only one single *raison de tat* can be accommodated within a single state at any historical epoch. The utility of a valid *raison de tat* for state building and state integrity is very consequential in the general discourse on crises of states of fragilities especially, as this relates to emergent new states in the developing world.

2. *Raison de tat of the State*

All states rely on a definitive *raison de tat* as its foundational building block. The Oxford Living dictionary defines it as 'a purely political reason for action on the part of a ruler or government, especially where a departure from openness, justice or honesty is involved. The Merriam Webster online dictionary adds that, it can be taken to mean 'a motive for governmental action based on alleged needs or requirements of a political state regardless of possible transgressions on the rights or the moral codes of individuals. The essence of this concept actually is derived from the original works of the Jesuit Giovanni Botero in his piece titled '*Della Ragion di Stato*' and as edited by Bireley (2017). In this instance, Botero posits that, the composite of any standard *raison de tat* of the state will consist of the following image cast:

- The state as a provider of human security against all existential threats: internal and external
- The state as the supreme authority that settles all social disputes
- The state as the only legitimate user of force or coercion in social conducts
- The state as the provider of equitable opportunities and material conditions for individual and group self-determinations and wellbeing.
- The state as the external representation and defense

The range of valid justification for existence of the state also evinces a broad range of structural functions which it is required to perform over time. We argue that, how an evolving state instance attempts to perform these statutory tasks and what constitutes the outcomes of such attempts, bear directly on whether it will totter at the verge of systemic stability or across the wide range of systemic anomies – fragility, failing, failure and outright collapse (Ovie-D'Leone, 2019b).

3. Functions of the state and potentiality for anomies

Using the frame of analysis presented by Tilly (1976), we can conceptualize the following strategic functions of the modern state as consisting of the following:

- War making functions—this idea requires state formation to be conducted by use of force with a view to neutralizing all competing external claims to its territory, people and resources
- State making functions – this requires external recognition and neutralization of all competing internal dissents.
- Protection functions – this requires the sovereign to offer credible assurances as a means to legitimize its sovereign authority internally amongst the citizenry
- Extraction functions – the sovereign is required to engage in public sphere taxation as a means to fund its expenditures.

As it were, Tilly's frame of analysis however tendentially back-stages other critical functions of the state that ordinarily would have also justified or also legitimated state extraction functions. In the first instance, there is a dire need for provisions of basic infrastructure and ample opportunities in the economic sectors for citizen to engage in profitable ventures wherefrom they could secure the requisite resources needed to pay their taxes to the Government. Across Africa, we have experienced an appalling trend of failing state capacities in this critical area. Tilly's thesis therefore urgently needs a re-phrasing here with a view to incorporating these set of statutory ancillary functions as vital composites of the pre-conditionality for these structural functionality of any state in Africa. To do this, it will require condensing Tilly's functions into two broad categories: 'core or existential functions. This frame readily incorporates all of Tilly's cardinal functions as well as interposing a set of subsidiary or ancillary functions of the state that encapsulates the full rubric of activities that should ordinarily fall under the umbrella of what is known as 'state building' dynamics. Viewed against the foregoing backdrop, a logical or indeed rational determination of the incumbent status of any state will depend largely on its inherent capacities to effectively perform all functions listed under each sub-heading as proposed by Tilly's frame of analysis. The rubric of failing state, failure and collapsed index will therefore be analyzed within the theoretical context of the structural functionality of the state as advanced by Tilly (1976) and even an incorporation of Moore (1966) analysis.

4. Rubric of failing, failure and collapsed state Index

The Fund for Peace in its 2019 Report reiterates the index of what constitutes a failing state as follows:

- ***Failing state index***
 - i. A weak central government that is so ineffective to the level of being unable to raise tax or other support.
 - ii. It has little practical control over most of its Territory.
 - iii. It has no provision for public service.
 - iv. It has pervasive/widespread corruption.
 - v. It has widespread rate of criminality.

- vi. Appearance of refugees and the involuntary movement of population.
- vii. It experiences sharp economic decline.
- viii. A state that can experience foreign military intervention at any time.

➤ ***Failed state Index***

Woodward (2017) in her analysis asserts that the following parameters can be taken to represent Failed State Index:

- i. A political body that has disintegrated to a level of where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign state no longer function properly.
- ii. A state that has lost its legitimacy.
- iii. A state that is weakened and has its living standard declined.
- iv. Total loss of territory control.
- v. The legitimate authority to make collective decisions has been eroded.
- vi. Inability to provide public goods.
- vii. Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. Examples: DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda.

➤ ***Collapsed State Index***

A collapsed State is one with breakdown or outright collapse of the government within a sovereign state (complete failure of government within a sovereign state as in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia Republic (Call, 2011). The parameters to determine this status include:

- i. The state becoming a mere geographical expression.
- ii. The state exhibiting a vacuum of authority.
- iii. Political goods are obtained through private or adhoc means (either outsourced or hijacked in to the black market by state shadow actors).
- iv. A state in which a polity has completely fallen.
- v. A state that experiences economic collapse due to a collapse in political activities.

5. Casual factors Inherent in the failing, failed and collapsed state scaling

We argue that, the causal factors for failing, failed and collapsed state continuum are broad based but can be condensed into the following frame of analysis as advanced by Ovie-D'Leone (2019a):

- Whence state form tend to bear relatively on capacities of states to be stable or fragile over time. This is a notion that attributes immediate factors for state failure or collapse at the doorsteps of how they have been formatted right from the onset. It is an adaptation of Tilly's thesis on 'European state making' where he attests to the fact that the European state made war and war made the European state (1976). It is a claimant that generally exalts the utilities of use of brute force and end-of-war agreements as the foundation basis for state creation across Europe, especially as exemplified during the Napoleonic war era. But instead of recourse to force, we argue for mutual re-negotiations of all instances of failing states across Africa. In this instance, the general assumption advanced here in the paper is that, whence there are no consensual agreements between the composite groups within a

state instance, there is a high potential for a state to become quickly anomic and consequently it tends to develop a capacity to vacillate along this continuum. Trends across Africa evince attempts at imposition of a broad range of Eurocentric externalities known to have become complicit in the chronic anomies associated with the African states (Huntington, 1991).

- The inherent capacities of the state to perform its statutory functions and project its authority across its sovereign territory tend to also have consequences for its abilities to become stable or unstable over time. This causal factor for states of fragility can further be analyzed under two broad frames consisting of what we call endogenous and exogenous factors:

i) Endogenous factors that can influence a state's capacity to govern in Africa

a) When there is little or no useful compact between the elites to govern according to democratic practice including the rule of law on one hand and where we have sharp disconnect between the elites and the masses who feel perpetually marginalized from the nation's political processes on the other hand.

b) If there is chronic lack of national funds to effectively govern owing to unwholesome public looting or where we have a dramatic national economic downturn emanating from the adversities of wilful execution of a nation's economic policy, as well as over centralization of national bureaucracy usually leading to spike in pervasive public corruption.

c) Where we have failing capacities of states to effectively extract taxes or where we have a general relapse into ineffective extraction activities by public institutions due to interferences by competing shadow state actors (as occurred during the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia where the two governments were seemingly seen as equal rivals with rebels in extracting the state's natural resources-diamonds for export).

d) In a situation where a state fails to formulate and implement feasible public policies and programmes including capacity building in the area of human capital development.

e) Where the restricted sovereign territory of a state becomes difficult for effective monitoring, policing and exercise of basic administrative controls due to reduction in national income, interference by shadow state actors usually prowling on the fringes of such territories with intentions to subvert authority of the state at the slightest chance.

ii) Exogenous factors influencing a state's capacity to govern

a) Level of penetration of European imperial, colonial and capitalist legacies.

- b) Degree of international amity versus counter-mobilization on the foreign scene.
- c) Character of prevailing international politics or ‘Zeitgeist’ –mode of dominant member of the international community as to whether they are favourably disposed or not toward that government.
- d) Presence or otherwise of strategic mineral deposit required on the foreign scene and where there is a chronic lack of internal technological capacities to exploit them.

6. Policy options to tackle states of fragility in Africa.

a) How can a states (re)Build?

There is a medley of practical steps which a state can adopt in attempts to (re)build its fractured structural foundations with a view to forestalling any eventuality for a forward slide in that anomic continuum. Equally so, there are a number of models on state building paradigms which a state can also adopt in this area (Ovie-D’Leone, 2019a). They include the following:

- By negotiating consensual arguments between all composite groups within the state.
- By evolving a set of common values and ideas as a basis for a national ideology needed to drive growth and development.
- By evolving a holistic sense of national identity that abstracts sharply from the primordial ethnic fixations of the past.
- By drawing up a comprehensive national strategic plan focused on all sectors of polity, economy and society – one that is implemented in phased stages of the national growth process and synched with each strategic sector or polity, economy and society.
- These will include also capacity building in the security sectors; rule of law, mechanisms for adequate check and balance; human capital development; adequate power generation and distribution including other strategic public sphere infrastructures like roads, medicals and education; domestication of technology that boosts industrialization; siting of new industries, increasing agro-productivities and mineral explorations.
- By embarking on elaborate programs of offshore national investments.
- By providing profitable legal environment and transparent business practice ambience to encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

b) State building modalities:

- Gradual and calculated break with the wastage and squalors of the past, by collapsing, competing and duplicating public institutions into manageable numbers. That is, by pruning down public governance structures to reduce costs.
- Popular engagement of the masses in the state’s (re)building process by creating grassroots programs of empowerment and capacity

building in the areas of creating new grassroots institutions and infrastructure with potentials to reverse the perennial rural-urban drift.

- Implementation of a robust national educational system that frees students from the encumbrance of exorbitant high tuition fees and one that is tied to a pay-back system of student loans after graduation. This scheme promises a lot of potentials needed to fully harness the state's range of human resources and national human capital development.

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